SUBJECT: Reinvestigation/Repolygraph Program

Since becoming Director I have stressed the importance of having a sound security program both within the Agency, and in the industrial arena. Following a review of the case of former employee Edwin Moore who in 1976 attempted to pass classified material to the Soviet Embassy here in Washington, I directed that increased emphasis be given to the Reinvestigation Program which had not previously been receiving adequate resources or high priority attention. The Moore case made clear to me that there was a need for a continuing program to identify potential security vulnerabilities or problems of a personnel security nature which could develop into an actual threat. I have very carefully reviewed the polygraph coverage, which is an integral part of the reinvestigation process, and I am satisfied that this is correctly a vigorous security effort properly focusing on the security and counterintelligence issue.

Repeating again what I have so often stated in the past, the unauthorized disclosure of classified information has become one of my major concerns. Since April 1977 we have been emphasizing the importance of reinvestigations, with a view toward processing larger numbers of our employees, without in any way sacrificing the quality of the security effort. Most certainly, events of recent weeks make clear the utmost importance of a strong personnel security system. In my efforts to improve our overall security posture, this specific program definitely merits the support of Agency managers at all levels, for it has uncovered security lapses.

I want all Agency employees, particularly first-line supervisors, to know that this program has my personal endorsement, and I encourage all of you to lend your cooperation and assistance to this important security endeavor. I would like to stress that the Reinvestigation/Repolygraph Program, is simply an orderly and periodic review and updating of the clearances of all Agency employees, and it should not be viewed as coercive or threatening in any way.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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19 September 1978

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